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Background
The death toll in England from Covid-19 has claimed to have 
peaked on April 8th 2020 (Dorling, 2020) or least reached 
its the first peak, and the infection rate, at least in the commu-
nity, appears to be declining. The overall number of Covid-19 
related deaths reported by July 22nd 2020 was 45,422 in the 
UK and 40,828 in England although both might be an underesti-
mate as at 30/06/2020 the excess mortality for Covid-19 related 
deaths in the UK is estimated at 64,451. Men are more likely 
to die from the virus than women and the risk of dying from 
Covid-19 is age related with older people most at risk. The overall 
aim of this opinion paper is to critically examine national 
government policy in England which, over the last five months or 
so, has attempted to control or manage the Covid-19 pandemic. 
The paper will begin with a descriptive account characterising 
the policy to date and then provide a critical analysis of why 
it has taken the shape that it has identifying the key influences 
and interplay of powerful interest groups.
The policy response in England
The government policy response might be described to date as 
one which was characterised as reactive (McConalogue & Knox, 
2020) was slower to develop than in other countries, which sig-
nificantly changed its direction at least earlier on, and lacked a 
clear and consistent communication strategy particularly about 
exit plans. It has also been tied to medical science, or one brand 
of it (Paton, 2020) although this has loosened in relation to the 
more recent policies involving the relaxation of the stringent 
control measures.
The government response to Covid-19 in England was origi-
nally described in terms of three phases which were: containment 
(e.g. contact tracing, education for effective hand washing), delay 
(which aims to flatten the peak of the outbreak to protect the 
NHS and provide time for research to develop effective tests, 
treatments and vaccines) and mitigation (based on the idea of 
‘herd immunity’, where the epidemic should be allowed to run 
its course to allow the population to build up resistance to it. 
Mitigation would be introduced to limit the number of deaths 
through protecting the most vulnerable, but the government 
would not need to totally eradicate the disease). The general 
approach was presented as evidence-based, with the Scientific 
Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) appearing to actively 
provide advice and some argue, drive policy (McConalogue & 
Knox, 2020). An emphasis was placed on the timing of the 
introduction of policies to maximise their effectiveness based on 
the scientific evidence (Calnan, 2020a; WHO, 2020).
Containment was the initial policy, but on March 12th the gov-
ernment announced it was moving from the containment to the 
delay phase with the caveat that this policy would not be as ‘dra-
conian’ as adopted in other countries. The Prime Minister (PM) 
raised his profile and, in the first of the televised daily media 
briefings/updates, was flanked by two medical and scientific 
experts. The PM gave the ‘honest ‘message that people might 
lose their loved ones suggesting it should be taken seriously 
as it was the ‘worst public health crisis for a generation’ (Paton, 
2020; The Health Foundation, 2020).
This painful message was difficult for the public to accept and 
their response in combination with new scientific evidence appears 
to have led, a few days later, to a shift in policy. This epidemio-
logical modelling evidence (Ferguson et al., 2020) was based 
on the experience mainly from China. The report recommended 
suppression as the policy option – apparently not an option 
seriously considered initially by the modellers as it was not 
expected to be acceptable both political and socially. The pol-
icy of suppression aims to reverse epidemic growth rather than 
mitigation which according to the report would have led to the 
overwhelming of the health system and the loss of hundreds of 
thousands of lives. Thus, the government moved from its delay 
strategy towards a policy of suppression of the transmission. 
Schools were to remain open, but the government advised the 
public to adopt social distancing and curtail social activities such 
as the use of pubs/restaurants, to work from home where pos-
sible, with individual/household isolation for 7 or 14 days for 
those with symptoms. This policy put an emphasis on advising 
the public rather than instructing them as adopted in other coun-
tries and seems to reflect the influence of behavioural psycho-
logical expertise, or some strands of it, with concern expressed by 
some government representatives about public behavioural 
fatigue (Oliver, 2020).
The government then began to take more stringent measures 
such as increasing control and limitations over foreign travel, 
shutdown of schools in England and banning the gatherings of more 
than two people (excluding people who live together). 27 million 
households were to be sent letters highlighting the need to con-
tinue social distancing and to only leave the house for shopping 
for basic necessities, exercise, any medical need and travelling to 
work if unable to work from home. There was a change in the 
tone of the message from government as the emphasis shifted to 
‘instructing’ rather than ‘advising’ the public. Emergency legal 
powers were introduced to enforce these measures suggesting 
that the public, or at least some sections of the public, could not 
be trusted to behave responsibly. The police have been given the 
power to fine people(which have been increased in the most recent 
      Amendments from Version 1
Policy changes in this field have been fast moving so this revised 
version has edited and updated the policy developments and 
changes in England which have taken place over the last two 
months concentrating on describing  policies which have involved 
gradually lifting the restrictions and any problems associated  with 
their implementation. These changes include other developments 
such as the second peak in some localities with the renewal of 
restrictions.
A number of reports and papers have also been published 
recently containing critical analyses of these policy developments 
and related data so these have been cited in the text and new 
references added. The theoretical approach taken in the paper 
was derived from the authors book and has been elaborated on 
which was a comment raised by one of the reviewers.
Any further responses from the reviewers can be found at the 
end of the article
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review) who are not adhering to these measures and concern 
was then expressed about a lack of consistency in the exer-
cise of these powers by the police. There was also the potential 
threat to civil rights if there is a further extension of such coer-
cive policies although these powers were required to be renewed 
every six months. Survey evidence suggests the public were una-
ware of the strength of many of these powers available to the 
police (Duffy, 2020). The extent to which the public did not 
adhere to the restrictions is difficult to judge, although overall 
adherence continued to be relatively high (Duffy, 2020).
Policies also focused on trying to free up and repurpose capac-
ity within the hospital acute sector. The NHS negotiated block 
contracts with private hospitals who have a relatively small 
number of intensive care beds but would treat non-urgent 
NHS patients. The policy discourse has emphasised a partner-
ship between the two sectors (West, 2020) particularly in time 
of crisis although others have seen it a further sign of creeping 
privatisation encouraged by the government:
‘ Deloitte, KPMG, Serco, Sodexo, Mitie, Boots and the US data 
mining group Palantir have secured taxpayer-funded commis-
sions to manage Covid-19 drive-in testing centres, the purchas-
ing of personal protective equipment (PPE) and the building 
of Nightingale hospitals.’ (Garside & Neate, 2020).
This apparent need to turn to the private sector for national 
emergencies has been explained by the lack of investment in the 
infrastructure of the NHS and privatisation over the last ten 
years (Lawrence et al., 2020).
The building of temporary Nightingale hospitals throughout 
the country (one in East London had a full capacity of 
4,000 beds, although it has recently been mothballed as 
underused but may be required if there is a second peak) has 
expanded the number of intensive care beds and recruiting 
retired clinicians has begun to address the shortfall in staff with 
500 trained staff being reported as being recruited from that 
source. The government said it would write off £13.4 billion of 
historic NHS debt (The Health Foundation, 2020) so that 
hospital trusts are in a “stronger position” to deal with the 
outbreak. Policies aimed at increasing the supply and distribu-
tion of protective equipment for frontline staff such as gowns 
and the availability of ventilators and the expansion of testing of 
staff and patients/public have proved more problematic to 
implement and have been a focus of widespread criticism 
(Calnan, 2020a).
The recognition of the need for systematic testing, although 
abandoned initially, led the Minister for Health to set an 
‘audacious’ target that across five different pillars 100,000 tests 
would be carried out per day by the end of April, while during 
Prime Minister’s Questions the next stated target was 200,000 
a day by the end of the month (Buck, 2020). In the weeks lead-
ing up to this deadline, the level of testing for the virus in 
staff and patients continued to be significantly below that tar-
get but by April 30th the number of tests reported to have been 
carried out reached well over that figure (122,347) although 
it is suggested that this figure is artificially inflated by the 
inclusion of self-testing kits which have been posted to be 
people homes but not yet completed. This daily level of testing 
has varied since then not consistently hitting the targets and it is 
claimed at May 31st, 2020 that the capacity for testing is over 
200,000 per day, with number actually being tested well under 
that (115,000).
The government also has renewed community contact tracing 
alongside a mobile app in mid-May, mobilising 18,000 contact 
tracers including 3,000 health professionals. This is being run 
nationally by a private outsourced company with limited involve-
ment of local public health expertise and experience in this 
type of work. This was trialled in the Isle of Wight with mixed 
results and although contact tracing has begun, it appears that 
it will not now be fully operational using a new app until later 
in the year . The use of this system has raised questions about 
threats to privacy and security and concerns about victimisation 
of those seen to be spreaders of the virus.
There is some still uncertainty about how far overall this is a 
coherent, phased, testing strategy (Godlee, 2020a). For example, 
as Grassly et al. (2020) concluded:
‘Testing is essential for pandemic surveillance but its direct 
contribution to the prevention of transmission is likely to be 
limited to patients, HCWs and other high-risk groups’.
The restrictions associated with the governments suppression 
of transmission policy were reviewed and the cabinet agreed 
to a further extension for three weeks. There was increasing 
pressure for the government to be transparent and outline its 
exit plans to the public and it set out five tests before easing of 
the restrictions can take place which were: Making sure the NHS 
could cope; A “sustained and consistent” fall in the daily death 
rate; reliable data showing the rate of infection was decreas-
ing to “manageable levels”; ensuring the supply of tests and 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) could meet future demand 
and being confident any adjustments would not risk a second 
peak. It is suggested that relaxation of social distancing meas-
ures will depend on the reproductive rate (R) being and staying 
below one. This R rate has informed the three-step conditional 
plan for gradually easing the restrictions with a non- specific 
timetable although social distancing rules are still in place. 
For example, step one recommended that from May 13th that 
people who “can’t work from home” are “actively encouraged 
to go to work” but to avoid public transport if they can; step two 
includes phased reopening of primary schools in June at the 
earliest and step three the reopening of public places in July. 
The government also changed its public message to “stay alert, 
control the virus, save lives” from “stay at home”. A Covid-19 
alert system was introduced by the government to track the virus 
which ranks the threat level on a scale of one-five with England 
currently still at stage four despite the easing of restrictions.. 
A change in policy is reflected in the recommendation of use of 
face masks by the public when in confined public spaces and it 
is now compulsory on public transport and in hospitals and 
in shops and supermarkets (Calnan, 2020a). These policies 
slightly differed between the devolved countries in the UK and 
this variation in policy continues to be evident (Brown, 2020).
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Policies over the last three months have focused on further 
easing of the stringent restrictions which were put in place 
in March 2020.These policies or the’ road map’, have been in 
the main tied, although not always, to the five tests for the easing 
of the restrictions which were set out previously and were to be 
linked to the Covid 19 system of alert levels which was down-
graded from 4 to 3 on 19/06/2020. There have been a number of 
policies introduced gradually over this period but perhaps the 
most significant were the reduction in the social distancing rule 
from 2 to I metre plus; the introduction and then revision of quar-
antine laws for travellers from selected countries to this country; 
the compulsory wearing of face coverings on public transport, 
in hospitals and more recently in shops; the re-opening of 
non -essential shops and the hospitality and some parts of the 
sports/entertainment industry; the permission for two households 
of any size were able to meet indoors and outside and for the 
vulnerable no longer needing to shield from August (The 
Health foundation, 2020). One policy, which has been the focus 
of a vociferous debate, was the plan for all primary school years 
to go back to school before the end of the summer term but 
this was not implemented by the government as it was 
inoperable. Schools will not now fully open until September.
Achieving each of the five tests has also proved problematic 
not least ensuring the supply of tests. There was considerable 
political rhetoric about the potential of the test and trace 
system but the bespoke mobile app was dropped and there have 
been communication problems between the centralised sys-
tem being run by an outsourced company and the local public 
health agencies who have considerable experience in this field. It 
has been reported that £10bn has been spent on this system 
and £15bn on PPE for frontline staff which are also provided 
by the private sector which it is argued suggest evidence of 
governments continued support for privatisation of the health 
service (Iacobucci, 2020a). One of the five tests also included 
the need not to risk a second peak but there has been evidence 
of second peaks in some local areas such as Leicester where 
stringent restrictive measures have been reintroduced. This 
outbreak has been claimed to be linked to the risks associated with 
the so called’ sweat shops’ of the garment industry found in this 
locality (Bland, 2020). Once again poor relationships between 
national and local public health agencies are claimed to be a rea-
son for the slow response to this outbreak as after initialling 
denying access it was agreed to provide local authorities with 
the data required for test and trace (Torjeson, 2020). However, 
the government has now given local authorities ‘lightning’ lock 
down powers to close shops etc. Medical scientists have argued 
for the need to be prepared for a second wave of Covid-19 in the 
coming winter with a prediction of further significant loss of life 
(Iacobucci, 2020b). The government has subsequently pledged 
an extra £3bn to ease winter pressures on the NHS in Eng-
land. The government has also set up a new Joint Biosecurity 
Centre(JBC) (Vize, 2020) which aims to play a lead role in coor-
dinating the response to Covid-19 and complement the work of 
SAGE which will focus on longer term problems. However, 
it has been suggested (Vize, 2020) that in the future the JBC 
might take over the role of Public Health England in relation to 
monitoring infectious diseases because:
‘Public Health England will be lined up by the government 
for a lot of the blame, perhaps partly on the grounds that it lost 
its focus on infectious diseases in favour of lifestyle illnesses. If 
Public Health England does not survive, it is possible to envis-
age the Joint Biosecurity Centre ending up as a permanent 
fixture with some of PHE’s communicable disease functions’ 
(Vize, 2020 p2)
The government addressed the economic consequences of their 
policies with an emphasis in policy on protecting the health 
of both the public and the economy and they have been attempt-
ing to juggle these priorities throughout. The initial response 
was in the spring budget which was followed by a much stronger 
package of measures introduced to provide support for 
businesses, supporting wages of vulnerable staff, address-
ing workers’ rights and pay during the ‘crisis’ and support for 
the self-employed. There has also been a commitment to chari-
table organisations who provide frontline care for older and 
vulnerable people (Calnan, 2020a). Some of these schemes, 
such as the furloughing policy, have been extended until October 
when it will finish raising concerns about high levels of 
unemployment. This has involved significant public expenditure 
and intervention in the market economy although the treasury 
describes many of these measures as temporary and unsustain-
able. More recently with the increasing emphasis on resuscitating 
the economy a plethora of policies have been introduced by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer including a Jobs Retention 
Bonus, giving £1,000 to businesses who bring back employees 
from furlough; a temporary VAT cut for hospitality and tourism 
- down from 20% to 5% ;An “Eat Out to Help Out” scheme for 
August, giving a discount to people eating at cafes, restau-
rants and pubs ; a rise in the threshold of stamp duty from 
£125,000 to £500,000 ;A “kickstart scheme” to get unemployed 
16 to 24-year-old into work and new payments for businesses 
hiring apprentices (The Health Foundation, 2020)
Explaining the shape of the policy response
The shape of health policy making in England has been shown 
to be influenced by the interplay of powerful structural and 
economic interests (Calnan, 2020b). The ‘loose’ theoretical 
approach adopted here combines a number of theoretical perspec-
tives ie structural pluralism and political economy. It is essen-
tially a socio-political perspective on health policy making and 
the policy arena of health and health care contains a number 
of powerful interest groups. The policy response to Covid-19 
clearly reflects this and a range of players have been and are 
involved which includes the government and its representa-
tives, NHS managers, scientific advisers and the scientific 
community, the medical profession, their representatives and 
clinical practitioners, the allied professions including nursing 
practitioners and social care agencies and workers, the private 
health and social care sector, the commercial sector who pro-
duce vaccines, ventilators and PPE, the media in the public and 
private sectors and the public, patients and their informal carers.
The influence of the medical profession
The focus here will be on the key players and one of these, 
as with other areas of health policy making in England 
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(Calnan, 2020b), has been the medical profession and medical 
and public health expert advisers have been particularly promi-
nent in shaping this policy response through advice. Government 
ministers have consistently invoked that decisions will depend 
on ‘the science’. However, the medical profession has been 
divided in their support of government policy with government 
medical officers supporting, but those who are more independ-
ent of it criticising the overall approach and those working in 
the NHS suggesting that services were inadequate particularly 
vociferous in relation to protecting clinical staff on the ‘frontline’. 
The emphasis in one sociological narrative of medical profes-
sionalism is that clinicians are driven by altruistic values (Calnan, 
2020b) and this seems to be supported by the argument 
that it is primarily the professional commitment of the staff 
with its public sector and ethical values which have sustained 
the NHS rather than government support:
“the NHS relies on the heroic professionalism and plan-
ning skills of its staff, and the self-control of the public”. 
(Abbasi, 2020a, P1).
One particular focus of criticism has been on the demise of 
public health in England particularly in its role in testing and 
contact tracing:
‘Too little, too late, too flawed…How did a country with an 
international reputation for public health get it so wrong? Their 
answer is a sad litany of past and present decisions that have 
fragmented, decimated, and marginalised public health in the 
run up to this moment when it is most needed. Their overriding 
message is that clear leadership from the centre needs to be 
matched with strong operational capacity at the local level. 
The UK currently has neither’ (Godlee, 2020b, P1).
The influence of scientific medical expertise
Evidence-based policy, or at least the discourse about ‘what 
works counts’, was popular with the Labour administration in 
the early part of this century (Calnan, 2020b). More recently, 
however, there seems to have been what might be described 
as a second ‘cultural turn’ which is reflected in the significant 
populist social and political upheaval in the Western world and 
the emergence of the post-truth society with a loss of trust in 
experts. Thus, this emphasis in the governments’ response to 
Covid-19 on trust in scientific experts appeared to reflect a 
marked shift in approach from a populist government, where 
some senior members had famously explicitly articulated a lack of 
faith in experts. It suggests a ‘rational’ approach to policy mak-
ing although it is difficult to judge precisely how far the evidence 
influenced decision making. Studies (Cameron et al., 2011) 
have suggested that evidence is sometimes used by policy mak-
ers as ammunition to justify policies that are favoured politically. 
Yet the media daily news briefings consistently involved both 
politician and medical/public health scientists and the foreign 
secretary (07/04/2020) referred to an evidence-based approach 
to shaping policies. This linear or rational approach has also 
been challenged for treating the evidence base, such as the math-
ematical models (Ferguson et al., 2020), which led to the shift in 
government policy, as rigid and as ‘boundary objects’ (Rhodes 
& Lancaster, 2020) when they should be seen as more fluid and 
the social process of the development of the evidence base as 
more emergent and adaptive. One particular problem in this 
context is the lack of evidence and uncertainties about the trans-
mission of the virus and its control. The government appears 
to have deferred to science, or one brand of science (Paton, 2020), 
to guide their policy although it is argued that this depoliticising 
strategy also could be used as a ploy for shifting responsibility 
from what is essentially political decision making about policy 
(McConalogue & Knox, 2020). However, despite scientific 
advice becoming front stage with the subsequent visibility of its 
uncertainties and limitations there has been some but limited 
criticism of this advice, at least from citizens. The government 
stance appears to be supported by the public as survey evidence 
suggests that the public have trust in science and research 
(Open Knowledge Foundation, 2020) but prefer data to be 
openly available for checking and they oppose restricting the 
public’s right to information. More recently, the government has 
made more explicit that the role of medical scientists is to provide 
advice and the government to make political decisions so the 
level of scientific support for recent government policy of 
lifting the restrictions is difficult to judge
Scientific opinion, however, has been divided, and there was a 
call for SAGE to publish its evidence and be more transparent 
which it eventually has (Government Office for Science, 
2020). Doubts were also raised about how independent the 
SAGE committee is in terms of its advice and recommendations 
because of conflicts of interests e.g. advisers employed by the 
government although even they are reported to have been in 
open revolt over the Cummings controversy (Abbasi, 2020b). 
There also is a suggestion that the scientists with the appropriate 
expertise were not consulted, for example in relation to test-
ing (Buck, 2020), implying that some scientific disciplines had 
a more powerful influence on policy than others.
The influence of NHS managers
NHS managers have also been key players as within the con-
fines of their budgets they are expected to implement government 
policy although they may have more discretion and lati-
tude in their decision making than the government would like 
(Campbell, 2020). One of the stated aims of the suppression pol-
icy was to protect the NHS from being overwhelmed. There are 
conflicting narratives about the position of the NHS in relation 
to its ability to have managed an epidemic of infectious disease. 
There is evidence which suggests that the NHS appears to be as 
prepared as any other health care system to meet the challenges 
of the demands of this unexpected pandemic. For example, 
in 2019 on a GHS health care security measuring preparedness 
the United Kingdom came second out of 195 countries with an 
index score of 77.9 out of 100. However, the report concluded 
that national health security is fundamentally weak around the 
world, that no country is fully prepared for epidemics or pandem-
ics, and that every country has important gaps to address (GHS, 
2019). In contrast, there are other reports (NAO, 2020) that the 
recommendations for epidemic preparedness were not priori-
tised or implemented due to lack of investment. For example, a 
contingency planning exercise conducted in October 2016 enti-
tled Exercise Cygnus, involving national, regional and local 
government bodies, highlighted, amongst other things, the lack 
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of PPE stocks particularly gowns but their recommendations 
were ignored and not published, although there is now a cam-
paign to make the reports’ recommendations public (Dyer, 2020). 
Little is known about the exercise – or the confidential rec-
ommendations that followed from it – other than it confirmed 
significant gaps in the country’s preparedness.
Other evidence suggests that the NHS is not performing 
well and has been performing at the limits of its capacity for 
some time, which probably reflects the chronic lack of invest-
ment over the last decade (Calnan, 2020b). For example, it is 
argued that Hospital Accident and Emergency (A&E) services 
(Cook, 2020) are a good barometer of the state of NHS per-
formance; in the last few years A&E services have consistently 
failed to meet four-hour targets. This raises questions about 
its resilience when under extreme pressure and as the WHO 
recently stated:
“Following chronic underfunding and a period of austerity, gen-
eral acute hospital bed capacity has fallen in the last 20 years 
in the UK. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, hospitals frequently 
ran at 92% occupancy and often over 95% occupancy in win-
ter, which is well over the capacity deemed to be safe”. (https:// 
www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/nhs-hospital-bed-numbers).
The eventual emphasis on more stringent suppression policy 
measures appears to be justified by the evidence but there has been 
much criticism, particularly from independent clinical and public 
health scientists, of the slower response of the government and 
NHS management to the outbreak and specifically their inability 
to learn from the experience of other countries:
“The UK Government’s Contain–Delay–Mitigate–Research 
strategy failed. It failed, in part, because ministers didn’t follow 
WHO’s advice to “test, test, test” every suspected case. They 
didn’t isolate and quarantine. They didn’t contact trace. These 
basic principles of public health and infectious disease con-
trol were ignored, for reasons that remain opaque. The UK now 
has a new plan—Suppress–Shield–Treat–Palliate. But this plan, 
agreed far too late in the course of the outbreak, has left the NHS 
wholly unprepared for the surge of severely and critically ill 
patients that will soon come.” (Horton, 2020).
This was a view shared by the majority of the public which, 
according to survey evidence, showed that 56% agreed that 
government measures were taken too late (Ipsos Mori, 2020). 
Germany and South Korea are countries which were seen to 
be successful in the reduction of their infection and mortality 
rate from Covid-19. For example, Germany’s policy approach 
was seen to be consistent and clear from the outset with an 
emphasis on testing as the following quotation suggests:
“Berlin’s strategy has nevertheless held up an unforgiving mir-
ror to Britain’s government. This is not just with regard to NHS 
capacity — tuned more for resource efficiency than resilience 
— but the quality and pace of decision making. The charge: that 
Britain’s strategy twisted and turned, squandering precious time. 
“It just wasn’t consistent. They tested various strategies and 
rejected them,” said Martin Stuermer, a virologist at IMD Labor 
in Frankfurt. “They had this plan to allow life to go on but ensure 
that elderly people were protected. But then they abandoned that. 
And they weren’t prepared for mass testing. but the main problem 
was that the government just didn’t chart a clear course in this 
crisis — unlike the German government. ” (Barker et al., 2020).
South Korea’s approach to testing, which involved devolution 
to the regions and drawing on local testing infrastructures, was 
not adopted in England, where a centralised system was favoured 
sequentially expanding outwards using public service labora-
tories although this was halted primarily due to limited capacity 
(McCurry, 2020).
The prioritisation of hospital care for Covid 19 patients also 
led to a decline in referrals for cancer surgery, in young people 
seeking help for mental health distress and the use of A&E 
and primary care services. This might have freed up hospital 
capacity but suggests a build-up of untreated physical and men-
tal health problems, which has been described as the ‘parallel 
epidemic’. Certainly, the social isolation policies may have 
not only increased loneliness and/or exacerbated mental health 
distress (Williams et al., 2020) but also has led to significant 
rise in calls for help for domestic abuse (Duffy, 2020).
The influence of social care providers
The focus in government policy had been on hospital care but 
the pandemic has had major consequences for both primary 
and social care and other public services which were not until 
recently part of this policy conversation. Social care provid-
ers are responsible for caring for the most vulnerable, and care 
homes are settings which, like hospitals, are currently where there 
is one of the greatest risks of transmission of the virus. The rec-
ognition of infections and deaths from the virus in social care 
settings remained invisible in the reporting of official statistics, at 
least in the early stages, and some of the deaths of patients with 
dementia may not have had a diagnosis of Covid-19 on their 
death certificate (Booth, 2020). Social care workers and their 
clients did not appear to be a priority for testing and for PPE. 
The limited service has suffered from cuts in funding, as have 
the third-sector organisations, who in some areas are the primary 
providers of social care. The importance of social care provi-
sion may have belatedly been recognised as its workers have now 
been given a distinctive ‘brand’ to match NHS staff. This crisis 
has highlighted the difference, and lack of integration 
(NAO, 2020), between the NHS and social care in terms of 
funding and priorities with the devolved and fragmented nature 
of social care based mainly in the private sector and the low 
status of its workers , which stands in marked contrast to the 
publicly funded and centrally organised NHS with a workforce 
containing high status professionals (Sloggett, 2020). It also 
raises questions about the extent of financial responsibility that 
the government and local authorities have or should have for care 
and protection in this sector, e.g. providing PPE.
The role of the public
The public also had a number of key roles to play through 
adhering to government policy and though collective action. 
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The PM emphasised the salience of public trust for enhanc-
ing adherence to government policies. There are a number of 
policies which are used to build or maintain trust (Bachman 
et al., 2015), but perhaps a more common policy, is focusing 
on enhancing accountability and transparency; the daily media 
Covid-19 briefings might have been seen as a strategy for build-
ing public trust through enhancing transparency about the risks and 
uncertainties as it displays honesty and integrity, i.e. being seen 
‘to level with people’. This raises the question of how uncer-
tainties should be managed and if they should be made explicit 
thereby making decisions more transparent, accountable and 
democratic or ignored and be bracketed off (Calnan, 2020b). 
However, transparency poses problems for governments particu-
larly in contexts of heightened uncertainties, such as with this 
pandemic, as greater transparency may enhance trust in that gov-
ernments may appear to working in the public interest but on 
the other hand it might increase exposure to lack of confidence 
in policy decisions and its implementation. Thus, for example, 
shifts in policy or poor communication giving unclear, confusing 
and contradictory messages, e.g. about the reasons for the lack 
of availability of PPE, about the changes in the message to the 
public or the recommendations to use face masks, can under-
mine confidence in competence. Certainly, there is evidence that 
the disclosure of uncertainties has only a small, negative impact 
on public trust (Van der Bles et al., 2020) and thus provides 
support for a policy of increased transparency. 
Evidence from surveys of the public showed majority support 
for government policy in the early days as it was evident that 
the stringent policies were necessary given the media images 
of other countries such as Italy and reports of ‘brutal’ ration-
ing decisions about gaining access to ventilators. However, more 
recently, public support for government policy has begun to 
wane, not least in the light of media criticism about the lack of 
leadership and problems with the provision of PPE for front-
line staff, expanding testing for essential workers and patients, 
the recent controversy about the governments senior advisor, 
Dominic Cummings, breaking the rules associated with the 
lockdown and the problems implementing the track and trace sys-
tem. Thus, trust in the UK government as a source of information 
about coronavirus has declined substantially since April. 48% 
rated the government relatively trustworthy in late May, down 
from 67% six weeks earlier (Fletcher et al., 2020). More recent 
survey evidence confirms this trend (Opinium, 2020) with 
47% not approving of government policies compared with 
34% who do and this decline in approval is mainly related 
to the public feeling that the government are underreacting.
Collective social action and social trust is also being called 
for in these policies, which involves the public trusting in one 
another to social distance and having some responsibility for 
the vulnerable and older people - a form of social and altruistic 
trust (Calnan et al., 2020). The success of this will depend on 
societal solidarity and Brexit has led to or exacerbated social 
divisions and a lack of societal cohesion although it has been 
manifested more positively in the recruitment of volunteers 
(750,000) to help the NHS and the weekly public applause for 
NHS staff. However, this might reflect trust or loyalty to the 
institution of the NHS which has its own social capital rather 
than trust in government policy. It is argued that health care 
systems are embedded in institutional contexts (Blank & Burau, 
2014) and do not just produce healthcare to improve health 
but they can establish the social norms that shape human action 
and therefore act as a repository and producer of wider social 
value (Gilson, 2006). These norms can help establish a moral 
community whom you can trust, and they may provide the 
basis for generalized trust. Thus, while they may have been 
some ambivalence in public attitudes towards government pol-
icy trust was enhanced by public support for the NHS as an 
institution (Godlee, 2020c), which also reflected nationalistic 
values (Fitzgerald et al., 2020).
The extent to which the government feels that they can have trust 
in the public’s actions may have shaped their decisions about 
relaxation of the restrictions. The emphasis in recent govern-
ment policy has been on shifting the responsibility towards 
individuals (and employers) to make ‘responsible risk judge-
ments’ such as in relation to decisions to return to work and on 
the more ‘moral’ message of following the publics civic duty of 
adhering to self isolation in relation to test and trace. In 
some countries such as Sweden (Tragarah & Ozkrmh, 2020) 
there is evidence of mutual trust between the public and the gov-
ernment, which might have suggested that stringent state control 
measures were not seen to be necessary although the effective-
ness of such policies is now in some doubt given the relatively 
high death rate at least compared with other Scandinavian 
countries.
One key characteristic of recent health service policy in 
England has been the focus on public and patient involvement in 
health care and the importance placed on shared decision mak-
ing and patient choice (Calnan, 2020b). The mantra associated 
with the reforms in 2012 Health and Social Care Act was ‘no 
decision about me without me’ which was derived from the 
disabled peoples movement. Evidence suggests (ONS, 2020a) 
people with disabilities are more at risk of dying from Covid 19 
than those without disabilities and such a pattern was more 
marked among the younger age groups than the older age groups. 
However, the voice and experience of the patient and their 
informal carers seems, at least at present, to have had little 
prominence in the policy conversation although  the consulta-
tion relationship between clinician and patient has been changed 
as a result of digitilisation which has been accelerated by the 
onset of the pandemic and social distancing. 
The influence of the pharmaceutical industry
In the early stages of government policy, one of the aims 
of the delaying of the transmission of the virus was to create 
the space for science to develop an effective vaccination and/or 
treatment. This involves a key role for the pharmaceutical indus-
try which is in the private sector in England and where much 
of the research and development for new drugs and vaccines 
is carried out (Calnan, 2020b). There is some, albeit cautious, 
optimism about both and having hope, as well as trust, has been 
shown as a means for bridging or managing uncertainty which 
has characterised many aspects of this pandemic (Brown & 
Calnan, 2012). Effective drugs may be on the market before 
a suitable vaccine (Mullard, 2020a), although there is intense 
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competition. Numerous candidates are being trialled such as 
those used in the treatment or management of Ebola, 
Remdesivir, which has recently been authorised by the US 
Food and Drug Administration for use in emergencies and also 
endorsed in Australia although recent evidence (Day, 2020)) has 
raised doubts about its effectiveness. Dexamethasone which 
is more widely used for the treatment of other diseases is a less 
expensive option. However, government policy has provided 
more financial support for a vaccine being developed in the UK 
which might be seen not only as a more straightforward way out 
of the restrictions but also as a way of enhancing public morale. 
There is uncertainty about the timing of the supply of a safe and 
effective vaccine and evidence (Mullard, 2020b) suggests that 
only 6% successfully come to fruition, which poses a risk for 
those investing in research and development although there is 
evidence of hopeful results from phase1/2 trials (Bar-Zeev & 
Moss, 2020). The scientific narrative about the time it will take 
to develop an effective and safe vaccine has varied between 6 
and 18 months, although it is reported that a new vaccine takes 
on average ten years to develop (Mullard, 2020a).
There is global competition in the race to develop a vaccine 
and there are currently ten vaccines at the stage of clinical trial 
although some are being fast tracked with trialling and manufac-
ture being carried out at the same time (Mullard, 2020b). This 
raises the question of how far drug companies will be transpar-
ent and willing to make public their trial results and share data 
and results in a coordinated effort. Certainly, given the global 
nature of the pandemic involving, at least at the present, mainly 
high-income countries, there may be more of incentive for drug 
companies to develop and manufacture a vaccine quickly com-
pared with the Ebola epidemic (Guzman, 2018; Tambo et al., 
2015), which involved mainly poor resourced low- and middle- 
income countries. However, given the level of public invest-
ment in vaccine development for Covid-19 the expectation is 
that the vaccine will be universally accessible although this will 
depend on nationalistic (Milne & Crow, 2020), geographical 
and commercial interests such as pricing and profitability 
(Mullard, 2020b).
The level of vaccine hesitancy or resistance in some coun-
tries (Wellcome Trust, 2019), suggests participation in a public 
health vaccination programme may not be attractive to all 
although this vaccine might be targeted at the adult population 
rather than children. Recent survey evidence (You Gov, 2020) 
shows the majority of people in Britain (71%) say that they would 
be willing to have a Covid-19 Vaccine with the over-65s being 
more likely to wish to be vaccinated. However, the priority placed 
on the treatment and management of Covid-19 patients has 
led to a reduction in public participation in other vaccination pro-
grammes for key diseases such as measles as it has with other 
health services.
The influence of the media
The strong emphasis on social distancing and social isola-
tion in the national government policy response to Covid-19 has 
placed an increasing public reliance on the traditional and social 
media for sources of information (Survation, 2020). The role 
of the media tends to be in framing and setting agendas for 
newsworthy health policy stories, which can shape both pub-
lic opinion and more directly government policy, although 
governments can also use the media, particularly state funded 
media, to communicate their political messages (Calnan, 
2020b). The media’s portrayal or framing of the government pol-
icy response has primarily come through BBC television’s live 
streaming of daily briefings to the news media and more gener-
ally the public. This is one way of ensuring the government 
remains accountable for its policy under critical scrutiny from 
the press, or least some sections of the press, particularly when 
parliament had been in recess due to social distancing restric-
tions. More recent briefings began to include selected ques-
tions from the ‘public’. This is also a means for Government to 
use the media to get their message across about protecting the 
NHS, to promote their policy and to be seen to be actively trying 
to combat the virus (through, for example, the building of 
new hospitals) a form of symbolic policymaking.
The media briefings particularly used graphs portraying statisti-
cal trends in social distancing, infection and deaths, which aim 
to illustrate the scientific approach being taken and encourag-
ing, at least some members of the public, to become ‘armchair’ 
epidemiologists (Rhodes & Lancaster, 2020). The format 
of the briefing was managed by the government through the 
public service medium of the BBC, even though the latter had an 
uneasy relationship with the government prior to the pandemic. 
However, while some of the questions from the media were 
critical in relation to the lack of systematic testing or patchy 
distribution of PPE, or the alleged breaking of the lockdown 
rules by the government advisor Dominic Cummings, there 
was little scope for confrontation or pressing if questions were not 
answered. Different ministers lead the briefing perhaps to reflect 
that it is not just a public health problem but has wider social, 
legal and economic implications. The briefings may aid politi-
cal visibility, transparency and accountability but the variations 
in the quality of the communication strategy has not enhanced 
credibility or trustworthiness. Survey evidence shows the 
broadcast media, especially the BBC, were more trusted then 
the newspapers (Survation, 2020), although it has been shown 
that the public generally adopt a critical or sceptical stance with 
the media and the importance of trust may be overstated in this 
context (Calnan, 2020b). However, more recent evidence shows 
trust in news organisations is in decline, from 57% to 46% 
(Fletcher et al., 2020), with the public generally avoiding news 
broadcasts which has led to the televised press briefings being 
reduced to weekdays only and more recently to occasions 
when significant developments are to be announced.
In relation to the social media, there is recognition of its 
important role for representing diverse voices and increas-
ing the accountability of government (Limaye et al., 2020). Yet 
this needs to be balanced against concerns (Open Knowledge 
Foundation, 2020) about misinformation about inside infor-
mation about secret plans and health service failures and 
peddling conspiracy theories, e.g. that 5G is linked to coro-
navirus. For example, NHS England announced measures in part-
nership with Google, Twitter, Instagram and Facebook to combat 
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“fake news” about coronavirus. They include Google search 
pointing people first to verified NHS guidance when looking for 
“coronavirus treatments” or “coronavirus symptoms”; and work-
ing to suspend accounts producing false information (West, 2020). 
Misinformation about the risks of vaccines primarily through the 
social media have fuelled the propaganda of the anti- vaccina-
tion movement which may also become prominent if and when 
a vaccine becomes available for Covid-19 (Calnan, 2020b).
The influence of commercial interests
Finally, government policy has not only consequences for 
the economy as whole but also for social and economic inequali-
ties. The lack of early state intervention might have reflected 
the neoliberal values of a Conservative government and their 
reluctance to intervene, and also that they were initially think-
ing of adopting a mitigation strategy which may have avoided 
the need for some of the severe social distancing measures that 
are now having an impact on the country’s social and economic 
life. The five tests set out by the government which they argued 
needed to be met before relaxing the restrictions focused on health 
consequences, i.e. on minimising deaths. There was, however, 
pressure on the government to lift the restrictions owing to con-
cern about the negative impact on the economy (now in reces-
sion) which the evidence suggests has experienced considerable, 
potentially long-standing damage in terms of a loss of produc-
tivity. It has been argued that some of these have yet to be met, 
such as being confident that there will be no second spike and that 
there are no problems with testing capacity and supplies of 
personal protective equipment (O’Dowd, 2020). Thus, it appears 
that the recent relaxation of the measures were driven by a 
political decision to meet social and economic interests rather 
being tied to the science and meeting the criteria outlined in 
the five tests (Abbasi, 2020b). Certainly, there is much criti-
cism that the scientific evidence has been ignored in these recent 
policies and that England is not currently well positioned for 
a roll back of the lockdown compared with other countries 
(Hale et al., 2020). However, as the following quotation sug-
gests, there may need to be a trade-off between the public health 
and the health of the economy although the latter also has conse-
quences for both physical and mental health in the longer term:
“The government’s decisions about easing the restrictions 
should be guided not only by a desire to minimise deaths from 
Covid-19 but also by a desire to minimise all avoidable deaths 
and to maximise living standards. Exactly how much weight is 
placed on each of these objectives is a political judgment and will 
depend not only on the average costs and benefits of interven-
tions that might be incurred or accrue across the population but 
also on how those are distributed.” (Tetlow et al., 2020 p16).
Yet, a counter argument is evident in relation to the introduc-
tion of the new quarantine laws for visitors to England. Public 
health concerns appear to have taken priority over the possible 
economic damage to the travel industry, although this policy has 
led to criticism and pressure to change these laws particularly 
from the aviation industry. However, these quarantine rules have 
recently been revised for visitors to this country from selected 
countries.
Broader analysis (Economist, 2020) of the impact of Covid-19 
on the economy has highlighted both gains and losses. The 
crisis is, according to this analysis, set to enhance three trends. 
First, there will be a quicker adoption of new technologies. 
Second, global supply chains will be redesigned, accelerating 
the shift since the trade war began with a critical mass of pro-
duction close to home using highly automated factories. Finally, 
there will be a further rise in corporate concentration as govern-
ment expenditure is taken up by the private sector and large 
companies grow even more dominant.
The hardest hit, both in the short and longer terms, from 
the disruption to the economy are the increasing number of 
people living in precarious social and economic circumstances. 
Survey evidence showed that not only had 19% lost their jobs 
but a significant number were or expected to have financial 
problems (Duffy, 2020). A report from the Resolution Founda-
tion (Gustafsson & Mcurdy, 2020) identifies 8.6 million key 
workers (almost four million health workers, along with educa-
tion, and food and pharmaceutical retail staff) and 6.3 million 
people in shutdown sectors whose health and economic posi-
tion is most at risk. Women are twice as likely to work in these 
in key worker roles as men (36 vs 18%), including two in five 
working mothers. Lower earners, those in the bottom half of the 
earnings distribution, are twice as likely to be key workers, 
and 2.4 times more likely to work in shutdown sectors, than 
they are to work in jobs which are likely to be able to be 
carried out from home.
There is strong evidence of social inequalities in the pattern-
ing of disease (Calnan, 2020b) and Covid-19 is no exception 
and inequalities have been both replicated and exacerbated. The 
social inequalities in the risk of serious illness and death from 
Covid-19 (ONS, 2020b) might be best explained less in terms of 
vulnerability to infection, the medicalised explanation, but more 
in terms of the social resources and living and working cir-
cumstances which enable or stand in the way of managing the 
illness. This might explain the relatively higher death rate 
amongst BAME ethnic groups reflecting systemic injustice 
(Platt & Warwick, 2020; Public Health England, 2020). Anal-
ysis of the social class inequalities in relation to Covid-19 
(Arber & Meadows, 2020) suggest a cruel irony in who 
initially transmitted it and who are most vulnerable:
“It is a cruel irony that the initial spreaders (or seeds) of the 
CV-19 pandemic were business people and the affluent (in other 
words, the middle class), but that the greatest causalities of the 
pandemic will be the poor and disadvantaged in western 
countries, and especially the populations of poorer countries.”
More recent evidence (ONS, 2020c) shows that the impact of 
the lockdown on people’s lives varies by income group. Those 
in high-income households have seen the greatest fall in travel 
time and a corresponding rise in time spent working from home. 
They also report having more free time than normal. 
However, people in low-income households were more likely to 
continue working outside the home, their increase in free time was 
smaller than higher-income households and time spent working 
away from home was unchanged.
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Conclusion
In conclusion the aim of this opinion paper has been to 
characterise the current health policy response adopted in 
England to control or manage the Covid-19 epidemic and to 
identify the key sociological and political influences which have 
shaped these policies to date. It is based on insights about policy 
developments as they unfold, which provides a unique oppor-
tunity to provide a prospective account although it cannot draw 
on retrospective data and hindsight which could portray a 
broader, critical overview of the policy in the future. The over-
all policy proposed by the government in England to date con-
verges with many other countries in Europe, although it required 
a shift in emphasis earlier on for this to happen. Its communi-
cation strategy has been inconsistent at some points, particu-
larly with regards to exit plans. The policy discourse has been 
strongly characterised by the management of uncertainty with 
a renewed trust in scientific and medical advice and expertise, 
although the link between policy and science has loosened of late. 
Along with the influence of medical scientific expertise an 
interplay of other powerful interests has shaped policy including 
NHS managers, professionals and staff, social care providers, 
the public, the media, the drug industry and broader commer-
cial interests. However, the reactive nature of this policy needs 
to be understood within a broader sociohistorical context in 
which there has been chronic underinvestment in both the NHS 
and in social care over the last decade (Calnan, 2020). The state, 
contrary to the neoliberal values of the current government 
with its preference for reliance on the market and deregulation, 
is playing an increasingly interventionist role in the social 
and economic life of the population through propping up 
the market and controlling social practices although it is diffi-
cult to judge how far these policies will be maintained and if the 
structure of the economy has been significantly reshaped 
or will revert back to ‘business as usual’.
The Government has recently committed to an independent 
inquiry (Iacobucci, 2020c) into their management of the pan-
demic so to what extent have these policies been successful? 
Social distancing and isolation policies have been adhered to by 
a large majority of the population (Duffy, 2020), the infection 
transmission rate has declined, at least in the community, and 
although the number of deaths from Covid-19 appears to have 
peaked (the first peak of several?) they are running at one of 
the highest in the world with social inequalities in the risk 
of serious illness and death. However, the key evidence to 
assess success, or relative success compared with other coun-
tries, will be the excess mortality data which should be available 
in the longer term. Preliminary evidence from analysis of excess 
mortality in Europe (Voce et al., 2020) shows the countries 
who ‘locked down’ earlier had fewer deaths and that Britain 
had one of highest death rates per population (McConalogue & 
Knox, 2020).
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